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LAST WAR OR AWAR TO MAKE THE WORLD
SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY:
Violence and Right in Hannah Arendt
1
Abstract: Paraphrased within the title of this text is a note Hannah Arendt
made in August 1952. After reading Carl Schmitt’s Nomos der Erde, Arendt tries to
confront Schmitt’s idea of a just war. In the text I attempt to reconstruct Arendt’s rea-
dingsof differingpoliticalphilosophytextswithinthe contextof her thinkingconcer-
ning the relationship between violence and power, force and law. Arendt’s refusal to
accept the existence of violence which can “conquer” freedom and “create” right
and democracy, brings contradiction to the great tradition of the followers of Marx,
towhom Arendtundoubtedlybelongs:howisandisrevolutionaryviolenceevenpos-
sible and does violence as resistance to injustice bring justice?
Keywords:right,law,force,violence,revolution,lastwar,justwar,rightfor
revolution.
Before I even begin explaining this complicated title (in the
title each word negates Hannah Arendt’s “position” and engage-
ment) and before I try to explain her use of the word violence
/Gewalt/, I would like to tell you a few words about a certain diffi-
culty that defines my text. The difficulty lies in the sources and
traces, which are at our disposal when we evoke somebody’s en-
gagement, life or the position of a certain man or group. We, I am
certain, represent the last generation of readers (I do not like the
word “researchers”) who still cannot freely consult (place in front of
them, at the exact moment necessary and anywhere) everything that
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1 Èlanak je raðen u okviru nauènoistra ivaèkog projekta Instituta za filozofiju i
društvenu teoriju u Beogradu Regionalni i evropski aspekti integrativnih procesa u
Srbiji: civilizacijske pretpostavke, stvarnost i izgledi za buduænost, koji finansira Min-
istarstvo nauke i zaštite  ivotne sredine Republike Srbije (br. 149031). Prezentiran je
12 oktobra 2006 godine na meðunarodnom kolokvijumu “LIFE AS AMOR MUNDI:
HANNAH ARENDT BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS“, u Brasiliji.is the object of their interests. In a few years, no doubt, all archives
and different testimonies will be completely accessible online, and
inthatwaycenturies oldintellectual constructions andfoolishnesses
will be erased in only seconds. Imagine how many texts, on Hannah
Arendt for example, today look very weak and hastily written only
because at the time they were written their authors did not have all
herJournals
2orherbook WasistPolitik? infrontofthem.Paradoxi-
cally if you do not read German,today it is easier to comprehend her
understanding of politics or war if you read Portuguese rather than
English. Thebook Oqueépolitica? wastranslated andpublished by
Reinaldo Guarany in Brazil in 1999, while the English, incomplete,
versionappearedonlylastyear(ThePromiseofPolitics
3).Pleaseex-
cuse my bad pronunciation, excuse me for not addressing you in
your own language and also for not being able to use the advantages
of the Portuguese language, in comparison to the English language
(and not only English) when terms that are applied to the word vio-
lence
4 are in question.
This year I am living in Aberdeen, Scotland and working at
the “Centre for Modern Thought” where I lecture legal philosophy
in the Law Department. This is, I remind you, the University where
HannahArendtheldtwoseriesofGiffordLecturesin1973and1974
(in the last several years these lectures have been held in Edinburgh,
but the “Centre” is trying to return them to Aberdeen). As you
already know the lectures from 1974 were interrupted because she
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2 H. Arendt, Denktagebuch, 1950-1973, München-Zürich, Piper, 2002.
3 Jerome Kohn (Ed.), New York, Schocken Books. The text “Introduction
intoPolitics”(pp. 93-204) was translatedintoEnglishby John E. Woods. Before this
there was an unpublished translation by Robert and Rita Kimber.
4 Everything that Arendt was trying to do in her texts, realizing that there is a
big problem with the German word Gewalt, various translators, into English, were
very precisely trying to shatter and destroyed. The translator of the text “Einführung
indiePolitik”didnottranslateGewaltasviolence,asArendtdid,butwithacoupleof
different words: “force”, “brute force” and vary rarely “violence”. Thomas McCar-
thy,thetranslatorofHabermases1977text“HannahArendt’sCommunicationsCon-
ceptofPower,”alsotranslatesHabermaswordGewaltasforceorforce,whileArendt
usesthewordviolenceintheEnglishlanguage.Theconfusionoccurswhen Arendt’s
otherbooks are cited, in which she, in originalEnglish, uses the word “force”. In one
of the last great systematic texts about violence Etienne Balibar tries to think the
meanings of the word Gewalt analyzing various ‘Marxists’texts. It is interestingthat
he completely avoids Hannah Arendt’s text (Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch des
Marxismus, Hrsg. W. F. Haug, Band 5, Hamburg, Argument Verlag, 2001).sufferedanearlyfatalheartattack.AsIwaspreparingthistextItried
to acquire an audio recording of the first series of lectures, as well as
thesecond. Iwasinterested inherreferencestoKant’slegal writings
andthefirstplaces whereKantappears–beforetheideaforthethird
part of the book The Life of the Mind (“Judging”)
5 came to light – in
Hannah Arendt analysis. Why “Judging”? How does Kant get into
the picture? More precisely, I was interested in the momentof union
of her readings of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, the merging of the
analysisofthosecelebratedfragmentsonpower,violenceandwar(§
28 and §83) with her “theory of difference” between violence and
power (this is the picture I refer to). Arendt’s lectures which we to-
day know under the title Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy
(firstpublishedin1982)
6,andinwhichsheshowsareserve(todayso
celebrated but also unjustified) towards Kant’s legal and political
works, are held for almost a decade during which she did her re-
search on violence which culminated in the book On Violence in
1970.
7 It is very strange, but Kant rarely appears in Arendt’s texts on
politics or war, revolution etc. (for example in the book On Violence
he is mentioned only once, p.27; in the book On Revolution twice
8).
Since I was unable to obtain what I expected in Aberdeen (and what
isnotinWashington’sarchives) allIcandoispresent toyoumysus-
picionandafewquestionstowhichIhavenoanswers:therefore,did
Kant, in the end, partially shake Arendt’s very strict and unwavering
opinion concerning (un)justified violence, violence which creates
even moreviolence and warwhich has no “meaning”?
9 Isit possible
to follow the genesis of the “Ninth Session”
10 in which Arendt ana-
lyzes Kant’s sentences on war which brings progress, serves culture
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5 I am referring to the Appendix, which can be found in The Life of the Mind,
Volume II, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978, pp. 260-261.
6 Ronald Beiner (Ed.), Chicago, Harvester Press, 1982.
7 I am using an edition by Allen Lane and Penguin Press (London).
8 H.Arendt,OnRevolution,London,PenguinBooks,1990(1963),p.54i229.
9 Why is war so “brutally”discardedfrompoliticalspace in Hannah Arendt’s
opinion and how to understand, in this context, this very important text which was
published in the journal Aufbau (November 14, 1941) “The Jewish Army – the Be-
ginning of a Jewish Politics?” (now translated and published in The Portable H.A.,
London, Penguin Books, 2000, pp. 46-48)? Or the text “Papier und Wirklichkeit”
from April 10, 1942 (Aufbau), in which peace is directly dependent on war : “Der
nicht im Krieg ist, auch nicht im Frieden”?
10 Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, pp. 51-58.and leads to peace? Why did Arendt never further developed Kant’s
dictumon peace as a “regulator” of warand conflict, which can con-
strain violence /die Gewalt einzudämmen/ (why didn’t she clear it
up, from Clausewitz’s complicated construction between Ziel /goal/
and Zweck /end/ to which she dedicated a few pages in the introduc-
tion to politics?)?
11 What can we find in Hannah Arendt’s unpub-
lished notes and lectures, and what did her discovery of a new hori-
zon in Kant, and progress as a norm for the judging and appraisal of
violence, do to the justification of violence?
I could formulate my main question in another way: I am in-
terestedinwhatexactlyitwasthatArendtreadofKant’slegalworks
(I mean specifically his lectures, his sketched lectures on the meta-
physics of morals and anthropology) so that I could reconstruct her
resistance to Kant?
Iwould like topause quickly atthis question which Ihave de-
termined as the most important. Therefore, I am interested in what
Arendt read of Kant, how she read it and why she hesitated to think
of her “theory” concerning violence with Kant. Lets leave a side, for
a moment, the context of this question. I think that the connection
between texts, entwining of texts and leaving some texts unread
12,
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11 “Forthegoalofallforceispeace–thegoal,butnottheend,sinceitisbythe
goal that we must judge all individual uses of force, applying Kant’s dictum (in Per-
petual Peace) that nothing should be allowed to happen in war that would make a
subsequent peace impossible. The goal is not contained within the action itself, but,
unlike ends, neither does it lie in the future. If it is at all achievable, it must remain
constantlypresent, and preciselyduringtimeswhen itisnot yet achieved. In the case
of war, the function of the goal is obviously to constrain force;” Was ist Politik?,S .
132; The Promise of Politics, p. 198. All the fragmentsin this book which were writ-
tenbetween1956and1959,andlaterbecamepartofabookonrevolutionandabook
on violence, can be read as an arrangement of different political texts which Arendt
considers, which she either accepts or rebuffs. The problem is that the names of the
authorsof these textsare hidden fromus: Bodin, Schmitt,Heidegger (Arendt manip-
ulates a couple of his seminars– one of them recently published), Jünger (mentioned
once), Simone Weil...
12 Hannah Arendt is surely responsible for the great mystery in connection
with her knowledge of Benjamin’s text from 1921 “Zur Kritik der Gewalt”. In the
textspublisheduptonowshedoesnotmentionhimorleavereadersinanydoubtthat
she knows him. However responsibility also lies with different keepers (policeman)
of the archives, but also on some readers who force connections between the texts
and who construct detective fables. Beatrice Hanssen (Critique of Violence, London,
Routledge, 2000, p. 16) speaks about Benjamin’s text as being “conspicuously ab-
sent” from the book On Violence, because it does not accept the later reception ofmost importantly conditions and dictates writing (“theory” or “posi-
tion”) and produces new contexts. I will repeat and emphasize –
texts, not events or quasi-pseudo events. Texts as events produce
contexts and events, and new texts. I will not complicate things fur-
ther or remain at the term “event”. That would be a great undertak-
ing. For now it is enough to remember the words of Hannah Arendt
andseehowsheapproaches andunderstands eventsinherowntime.
What does she do, what does she want? Why she wants to distin-
guish (distinguer, distinguer, as Ricœur says
13) and make order (or-
der among terms, order among texts)? Why is her answer to events,
her responsibility for those same events, manifested with the cre-
ation of distinctions and differences?
I will first count the “events”: Arendt usually thinks of all im-
portant events (the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the Ho-
locaust, Hiroshima, the bombing of German cities) in the context of
Lenin’s prediction for the 20th century as the century of violence.
14
The events (is a certain amount of violence a precondition for an
eventtoevenbeanevent?)areDecolonization,thecrisisontheMid-
dle East, student riots, the Cold War and the threat of a Third World
War, the first terrorist attacks, the crisis in Cuba, assassinations in
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Benjamin’s text which in fact begins with Derrida (Markuse deserves the credit for
the reprintingof “Zur Kritikder Gewalt” in 1965). On the otherhand itiscompletely
incomprehensible that some important documents about the relationship between
Benjamin and Arendt were published only a few months ago (Arendt und Benjamin:
Texte, Briefe, Dokumente, Hrs. Schöttker, Detlev/ Wizisla, Erdmut Frankfurt am
Main, Suhrkamp, 2006. Some of the letters have already been published in the jour-
nal Text und Kritik No. 166-167 (2005), S. 58–66.). The secret of Arendt’s “recep-
tion” of Benjamin’s text is not solved in this book. Furthermore, it is inconceivable
thatinArendt’slecturesandnoteswhicharefoundinherarchiveandwerepublished
asWasistPolitik?FragmenteausdemNachlass,UrsulaLudzcouldfindnomention
ofthenameCarlSchmitt(hisnameismentionedinacoupleoffragmentsonjustwar
in her Journal from 1952). Arendt’s interpretationof the term Nomos in Greeks texts
is in direct connection with her reading of Schmitts book Der Nomos der Erde im
Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum (Cf. Was ist Politik ?, S. 102-123; The
Promise of Politics, pp. 172-190). The only book which deals with the relationship
between Schmitt and Arendt is Enrique Serranos Goìmez book, Consenso y
conflicto: Schmitt y Arendt: la definicioìn de lo poliìtico, Colombia, Universidad de
Antioquia, Instituto de Estudios Poliìticos, 2002.
13 P. Ricœur, “Pouvoir et Violence”, Ontologie et politique, Paris, Tierce,
1989, p. 141.
14 This prediction also opens the book On Revolution, p. 11 and the book On
Violence,p .3 .America,thewarinVietnametc.Attheend(formetheendisthelast
version of Arendt’s text on violence and the year when it was fin-
ished, 1969
15) president Lyndon B. Johnson formed the “National
Advisory Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence”
(1968-69). The Word “prevention”, mentioned above, represents a
government’sandstate’sresponsetoviolence,whichisinonewayor
another produced by that same state. More than thirty years later, af-
ter a similar chain of events and extreme violence, an identical an-
swer by the same state and the same words can be found in “The Na-
tional Security Strategy of the United States of America” (another
president signed it twice, September 2002 and March 2006).
16
The names of the presidents and these documents are com-
pletely accidental and we should not strongly exaggerate the authen-
ticity of the hand that signs one document or institutionalizes a new
government commission. That could be (and was) Hannah Arendt’s
first answer to the violence which was occurring: the state is “unpro-
ductive”andaparasite(“parasiticalphenomenon”/parasitäreErsch-
einung/).
17 “The state” first of all expresses (and strengthens) certain
words which can paradoxically very often come from the left. The
concept of prevention (preemption is a variation of this word) is one
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15 The first abridged version of the book On Violence was published as “Re-
flections on Violence” in the Journal of International Affairs, winter 1969, pp. 1-35.
An identical version was immediately reprinted in the New York Review of Books,
February 27, 1969, pp. 19-31. From here on I will cite this last version.
16 Itisreallypossibletocompare,inonecompletelydifferentway,eventsfrom
thirtyyearsagoandnew eventsoccurringafterthecollapseoftheSovietEmpire(the
crisis of state sovereignty, wars and humanitarian interventions, catastrophic non-in-
terventions, Israeli wars and Palestinian terror, the 9/11 attacks and several wars in
connection with the endless “war on terror”). Just as the reconstruction of the old
middle-aged doctrine of just war (Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory) represented a
“theoreticalsolution”for the crisisin the seventies,Davor Rodin today suggestsnew
Ethics of War and the emergence of “asymmetricwar”. Cf. “The Ethics of War: State
of the Art”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2006, pp. 241-246.
Hannah Arendt’s target in 1952 was Carl Schmitt,but she instead hit Walzer and Ro-
din: “In fact, there cannot be a just war /gerechten Krieg/, because that would mean
that people are capable of comparing sorrow which comes from war with its content
/ob das Leid des Krieges mit seinem Inhalt kommensurabel ist/. But that is impossi-
ble. (...) Justice can only exist within law. However each war occurs outside law, in-
cluding a defensive war, in which I am forced to cross the edges, borders, of law
/auch ein Verteidigungskrieg, in dem ich eben gezwungen bin, den Rahmen – den
ZaundesGesetzeszuüberschreiten/.H.Arendt,Denktagebuch,1950-1973,S.243.
17 Was ist Politik?, S. 76; The Promise of Politics, p. 149.of the most sophisticated ways by which the most aggressive vio-
lence can be justified or by which the most horrible means can be
used to prevent social riots. All these years, it was completely unnec-
essary to search through Kant’s lectures and works looking for this
institution so we could find a series of legal political documents
(Kant-Achenwal-Wolff-Thomasius-Pufendorf-Grotius-Gentili-Leg-
nano-Ulpianus etc.) which would justify preventive war – a defen-
sive war which is actually an offensive war par excellence. It would
have been enough to listen to the just and pacifists because they con-
cern themselves with what Arendt will immediately stop doing – le-
gitimizing violence as a political act.
Any rational person would agree that violence is not legiti-
mate unless the consequences of such action are to eliminate a
still greater evil. Now there are people of course who go much
furtherandsaythatonemustopposeviolenceingeneral,quite
apart from any possible consequences. I think that such a per-
son is asserting one of two things. Either he’s saying that the
resort to violence is illegitimate even if the consequences are
to eliminate a greater evil; or he’s saying that under no con-
ceivable circumstances will the consequences ever be such as
to eliminate a greater evil. The second of these is a factual as-
sumption and it’s almost certainly false. One can easily imag-
ine and find circumstances in which violence does eliminate a
greaterevil(…)SoIcan’tacceptageneralandabsoluteoppo-
sition to violence, only that resort to violence is illegitimate
unless the consequences are to eliminate a greater evil.
18
Today, it is truly possible to reconstruct all these transforma-
tions in argumentation which contribute to violence and violent
85
F
I
L
O
Z
O
F
I
J
A
I
D
R
U
Š
T
V
O
3
/
2
0
0
6
18 This is a part of Noam Chomsky’s intervention in the debate on the legiti-
macy of violence in the Theatre of Ideas in New York, December 15, 1967 (In the
book On Violence, Arendt mentions this discussion, which she was herself a part of,
on page 79). In 1971 Alexander Klein published an integrated text in the book Dis-
sent, Power, and Confrontation, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1971, pp. 95-133.
Chomsky’squoteisfoundonpage107.ItseemsthatafterthisdebateHannahArendt
definitely began writing her text on violence and gave up on the idea that violence
can have legitimacy. It is interesting that after nearly 30 years E. Balibar, in the text
“Violence:idéalitéetcruauté”whichwasreadattheCollègedeFranceinParisandat
Cornell Universityin the winter 1995, repeats Chomsky’s arguments and speaks of a
legitimate violence, about “une contre violence préventive”.actions, into true crimes and murders which are carried out in the
name of the state, but also against state institutions. It seems that the
state (or government or cabinet or secret service of a state) is quite
frequently only an agent of the passage (“passage à l’acte”) of these
different “intellectual” voices (discourses
19) into real acts of vio-
lence. The uniqueness of this agent consists of the “power” to stay
anonymous and apart from any responsibility.
What does Arendt’s vision (“too absolutistic vision” (Chom-
sky)
20) consist of then and how can violence be stopped?
Arendtbeginswithtexts.Responsibility(oralackofresponsi-
bility and manufacturing violence) is, before anywhere else, found in
texts. When she reads Sartre or Fanon (“reading these irresponsible
grandiose statements”
21), when she recognizes the power of hypoc-
risy and muddling of arguments, when she recognizes “the power of
indifference” in the use of words and concepts in contemporary and
older texts, she simultaneously believes in the living text, in the
power of texts to recognize and stop die Stummheit der Gewalt. The
greatestevilanduniquenessofviolenceismuteness,anaphasiaofvi-
olence which begins, writes Arendt in April of 1953, when one
speakstonoone,doesnottalk,butratheronespeaks“about”(über)...
logical thought always leads to violence /Logisches Denken führt
daherimmerinGewalt/,logicleadstoviolencebecauselogictalksto
nooneandspeaksaboutnothing/Logiksprichtniemandanundredet
über nichts/. Logic prepares violence /So bereitet sie die Gewalt
vor/.
22 Two years earlier in a letter to Jaspers from March 4
th, 1951,
Arendtwritesthatphilosophycertainlyhasapartintheresponsibility
for all that has occurred in this century. “Its responsibility lies in that
western philosophy has never had a clear concept of the political
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19 Thefascinationwithviolenceandpowerearliermanifesteditselfintheform
of a great hurry of the philosopher to help and lead rebellious and terrorist actions
against the state (Cf. Interview with Sartre concerning his discussions with Andreas
Baader, December 1974, Les Temps Modernes, No. 632, 2005). Today, when the
governmentsof certainstatesare askingfor the help of theirresidentsby denouncing
suspicious citizens, philosophers feel called on to, as quickly as possible, legitimize
wars in the name of security, to justify stateviolenceand forced preventivemeasures
of “protection” and observing of citizens.
20 Dissent, Power, and Confrontation,p .1 1 9 .
21 On Violence, p. 20; “Reflections on Violence”, p. 21.
22 Denktagebuch, 1950-1973, April 1953, S. 345./dass diese abendländische Philosophie nie einen reinen Begriff des
Politischen gehabt hat.../...”
23 In the description of her project “Intro-
ductionsintoPolitics”whichshesendstotheRockefellerFoundation
in December 1959, she suggests “a critical re-examination of the
chief traditional concept and conceptual frameworks of political
thinking (…) By criticism, I do not mean “debunking”. I shall try to
find out where these concepts came from before they became like
worn-out coins and abstract generalizations."
24 There exists another
significant addition, which Arendt needs in order to further increase
the self-responsibility of the philosopher who is argumentative, who
is a “rational person,” who uses abstract generalizations and whose
sentences are always logically correct.
(…) we are all beneficiaries of past violence in this country. I
think we all can immediatelyagree on one point: namely, that
a great crime was committed by this country and that we are
now and have been paying the price for this crime. And it is
interesting to see how very long it takes a country to pay back
such really fundamental crimes. Many little crimes history
forgets, but such a fundamental crime as chattel slavery has,
as we know now, enormous, long-lasting consequences. But
to say that we are the beneficiaries of this past violence is an
interpretation which I could challenge on many grounds.
25
Violence has already been carried out, before any new vio-
lence and before any possible violence, before any new act which
makes it legitimate. We should immediately forget the country
Arendt speaks of (this could be absolutely any country) and the
crime which is found in the foundations and roots of this country.
Let’s leave aside, for now, that which is perhaps most important and
which willalways,inthis wayorthat, decide about the future ofvio-
lence. Let’s leave aside that which is always impossible to leave
aside. Here I refer to the grand and dangerous words used by Arendt
in this debate from1967: “paying,” “price,” “historywhich forgets,”
“benefits,” “fundamental and little crimes.” Besides, with these
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23 The quote is found in “Kommentar der Herausgeberin” (Ursula Ludz), Was
ist Politik?, S. 144.
24 “Projektbeschreibung”, ibid, S. 200.
25 Dissent, Power, and Confrontation,p .1 1 5 .words violence has always, up to now, replenished and continued. I
am interested – this is why I began with all those questions concern-
ing Kant and Arendt, this is why the title of this text contains two
words which Arendt never puts next to each other (Violence and
Right) – I ask myself,where is this “past violence,” of which Arendt
speaksof,found,andhowisitrecognized? Isithidden,institutional-
ized and “forgotten” within the power of one country?
26
With this question Hannah Arendt’s intentions should be
quite clear in respect to the violence which for Arendt represents the
greatest challenge of the 20
th century. The responsibility of Hannah
Arendt (and not only her) in front of violence consists of: (1) the re-
sponsibility of the philosopher (logician) Hannah Arendt who as
such creates violence, (2) the culpability of citizen H. Arendt who is
thebeneficiary ofthissameviolence whichsheasaphilosopher pre-
pared (keep in mind, this citizen is in fact a resting soldier; benefic-
ium means a privileged soldier) and (3) the penitence of the critic
(and not a simple debunker) H.Arendt, whose task is the reconstruc-
tion of power and the differentiation of violence from power- vio-
lence would in this way be transformed into perhaps the “power of
nonviolence”
27. I repeat, this task (3), of which she breathlessly
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26 In the book On Revolution, when Arendt writes about Machiavelli she
quickly explains “the task of foundation” (the setting of a new beginning), which as
such seemed to demand violence and crime (Romulus slew Remus, Cain slew Abel)
(pp. 38-39). It is quite difficult to establish the status of this “past violence,” especially
when one knows that Arendt paid no attention to violence which funds a sort of order
(right, or community), nor to the right to carry out violence, that is; legal violence. I
don’t think that there is any real possibility for any sort of “left over” violence which is
not swallowed and digested by a power. A similar difficulty appears in Habermas
forced introduction of Johan Galtung’s term “Strukturelle Gewalt” (from 1971), which
is impossible to incorporate into Hannah Arendt’s “theory of difference.” “Hannah
Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power”, Social Research 44/1 (1977), pp. 3-24
(“Hannah Arendts Begriff der Macht” Merkur (1976), No. 341, S. 946- 961.
27 The “power of nonviolence” refers to Gandhi and it is a concept in which
Arendtbelievesinforaverylongtime.InNovember1952shewritesthatGandhiisa
true example of a situation in which power managed to defeat violence Denkta-
gebuch, 1950-1973, S. 273. In a debate in TFI 1967 she speaks of Mr. Gandhi’s
“enormous power of non-violence”: “There’s no doubt that non-violence can be de-
feated, as every power can be defeated, by violence. But if the republic were to use
violenceinordertobreaknon-violentpower,itwouldsomehowbebreakingthevery
foundations on which it rests. It would be exactly in the situation in which, for in-
stance, the English were confronted with non-violence by Mr. Gandhi – an enor-
mouslypowerfulmovement…Dissent, Power, and Confrontation, p. 124. However,writes in her project for the Rockefeller Foundation, which she pre-
pared several years later, is envisioned to begin with great texts of
western thought and to continue in the archives.
Today,wemustbe interested in the Foundation’sdecision not
to finance this project of reconstructing the concept of the political
because the consequences of this decision are quite different. First,
Arendt delayed a task which is today as active as it was fifty years
ago. It is precisely the urgent need for such a book today which
leaves us hoping as well as saddened, because were such a book
written when it was suppose to be, perhaps we would have seen a re-
duction of violence in the second half of the last century. Further-
more, fragments concerning the politics of Hannah Arendt remain
discarded and un-systematized, haphazardly compiled and pub-
lished in the forms of small books and lectures. Finally, it has been
impossible to reconstruct her first sketches of projects, her unor-
derednotes,becauseeverythingwaslateandbecausethe“politicsof
archives”arealwaysobscure/derDunkelheitderArchive/
28andfun-
damentally unacceptable.
When I, for example, questioned Arendt’s reading of Kant it
seemed to me that the importance of Kant for her engagement was
greater then it now seems. I thought, at the same time, that I could
easily show you that there was not only deconstruction (mine or
HannahArendt’s
29)inthesourceofmyquestions,northegeneticsof
the text, nor the archeology of texts and connections between texts,
nor the usual scholarly analysis which every philosopher (and of
course,notonlythephilosopher)appliesduringthereadingofatext:
namely, while we read- we recognize texts we have already read
within the work we are reading, and we put aside what looks to us
new and unfamiliar (one more thing, in the text (or the texts) which
we read, we find what in fact doesn’t exist in it (them)).
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in the finaltexton violencefrom1969 Gandhi’s role is made completelyrelativeand
all importance is removed from it. Cf. On Violence,p .5 3 .
28 “The obscurity of archives”. I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, § 61,
Practical Philosophy, London, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 488.
29 To trulyundertakea “criticalre-examinationof thechieftraditionalconcept
and conceptual frameworks of politicalthinking”the help of different experts is nec-
essary. In the book On Violence (p. 43) Arendt cites Alexander Passerin d’Entrèves:
“The only competent guides in the jungle of so many different meanings are the lin-
guists and the historians. It is to them that we must turn for help.”With my question concerning the traces of Kant in Hannah
Arendt (this could also be Schmitt,Heidegger orHegel forexample)
I wish to (1) anticipate a great technological change which will
strengthen the importance of the (hyper) text, ease the finding of
texts within othertexts andreevaluate the“right”ofthereaderorau-
thortonotunderstand, toreduceorfantasize,andinaccordancewith
that, (2) I wish to insist on the instability and “violence” of the word
“position” – Hannah Arendt’s “position” for example (or Arendt’s
“understanding” of violence, Arendt’s “comprehension” of violen-
ce, or the impossible task found in the title, “Violence and Right in
Hannah Arendt”).
Arendt hesitates in her texts and discussion on violence, and
this is the first condition for discontinuing violence. Hesitation is her
resistance. Hesitation is perhaps that which enables thinking. With
Arendt there is no solution to the “problem” of violence, there exists
no definite end to, or allowance of, certain forms of violence, just as
there is no final text. There exists a last text – I have said that for me
this is the version from1969 – but this is certainly not the “final” text
nor an imaginarytext she attempted to write. Because of this it seems
thatthegenesis(generation,butcorruptionaswell)ofanidea,forex-
ample the figure of “nonviolence,” is more important than what
Arendt writes about Gandhi’s engagement in her final work. In order
to experiment with this genetic strategy in relation to her “position”
on violence, keeping in mind the two great reserves which I have
been trying to explain this whole time (“I don’t have “all” her manu-
scripts “in front of me”; and the other misgiving, my text is a sketch
not the last or final text), I attempted to find her originality by exam-
ining those forms of violence (or those thoughts on violence) which
she negates. Similarly I was interested, as in the case of Gandhi, to
searchfortheformofviolencewhichsheapprovesof–andthensud-
denly leaves. Therefore, just as in the case of violence “and” right, or
the theory of “just war,” Hannah Arendt negates the validity of any
sort of “militant democracy” /Streitbare Demokratie/.
30 There is no
sufficient reason for a war to make the world safe for democracy
31,
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30 This is Karl Löwenstein term. Cf. “Militant Democracy and Fundamental
Rights”, The American Political Science Review, 1937, p. 417 and p. 638.
31 Denktagebuch, 1950-1973, S. 217.andjustificationforwaragainstwarorthelastwaragainstwar,orvi-
olence against violence (vim vi repellere licet) is plausible
32.
Thenotion ofa“lastwar,”alsofoundinthetitleofthistext,is
mentioned in several geopolitical texts by Franz Rosenzweig, who
wrote them during the First World War on the Southern Front, in
Macedonia and Serbia. The “last war” is just another war which is
necessary for every possible war to be prevented. Despite the fact
that I am modifying the meaning of Rosenzweig’s concept, in ques-
tion is a war which bases its justification on it being the last war,
therefore preventing any succeeding or possible war. The problem
is, of course, that the last war can last forever (the “war against ter-
rorism,”like the war against the Devil, as you know has no border in
time). The problem is that such a war can be repeated and that it is
usuallythelastwarseveraltimes.HannahArendtleavesnoroomfor
the possibility of one such war or for one such last and extreme use
of violence
33. But if we free the concept of “last war” of the extreme
word “war,” and put in its place “violence,” if we try to, at any cost,
defend the imaginary literal word “last” (“last violence”), then it
would be possible to speak of Marx and the violence of a revolution
in the way Hannah Arendt understands it. This is not a permanent
revolution, but rather, the last, successful and all encompassing rev-
olution. This is not a “last war” but a last war of liberation.
Because revolution wants not to exchange rulers, not to ex-
change hunters, but to abolish hunters and persecutors and
oppression altogether.
34
I think that this could be the model, the only model, of vio-
lence which is justifiable for Arendt and which satisfies her criteria
for justification. More precisely, revolution in her interpretation and
modification of Marx, revolution as the last violence which puts an
end to any future violence, is the model by which she measures the
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32 Dissent, Power, and Confrontation, p. 100.
33 The readiness for the use of extreme violence is explained well in the fol-
lowing fragmentfrom December 1967: “The atom bomb: We invented it because we
dealt with the devil and were afraid the devil would know how to make it. We used it
against an ordinary enemy. We wished to keep it when there where enemies but no
devils – and promptly, to justify this, we invented a Devil. The danger now – we be-
come the devil. The model of all violence.” Denktagebuch, S. 672-673.
34 Dissent, Power, and Confrontation, p. 100.justificationofanyparticularviolence.Incomparisontothisviolence
which ends all violence and injustice, which is in reality above any
justification, every other violence is unjustified for Arendt; she finds
faultineveryotherformofviolence.Ithinkthatwearemissingmore
precise criteria and the systemof rules which Arendt uses to distance
and differentiate her hypothetical (revolutionary) violence and spe-
cific brute force (or brute violence) which we find in history.
All that I wish to do, at the end of this presentation, is to men-
tion several opening conditions of one possible preamble to a text
concerning violence which should brings us closer Hannah Arendt’s
unfulfilled project. Itseemstomethat shemanagedtoreveal thepri-
maryconditions ofonesystemwhichrevisestheconcept ofviolence
and which promises an end to violence:
1. Freedom and Life. “It is only possible to lead wars for free-
dom, only freedom has something to do with violence.”
35 In the fol-
lowing years, in her writings on politics, Arendt speaks of the pro-
tection of life and freedomthrough violence, but also of the threat of
violence on freedom and life (I remind you that Benjamin’s “divine
violence” protects andgiveslife).Theentwining ofthewords“life”,
“freedom” and “society’s life” is very difficult to understand. Two
sentences from this time are especially difficult. In the first, Arendt
speaksofaquestionwhichshedoesn’twishtoanalyzeatthetime:
For now let us set aside the question whether this decrease in
violenceinthelifeofsociety/desGewalttätigenimLebender
Gesselschaft/ is in reality to be equated with a gain in human
freedom.
36
The second sentence is also never repeated or thought:
Theviolenceissometimesnecessaryforthedefenceofpolitics
and those provisions for sustaining life /Lebensversorgung/
thatmustfirstbesecuredbeforepoliticalfreedomispossible.
37
2. Necessity. Arendt introduces this concept into her political
fragments as analogous to the concept of violence, and later as con-
trary to freedom. Necessity rules the life of society, but, in the same
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35 Es kann nur Kriege für die Freiheit hat irgendetwas mit Gewalt zu tun
(1952). H. Arendt, Denktagebuch, 1950-1973, S. 243.
36 Was ist Politik?, S. 74; The Promise of Politics, p. 148.
37 Ibid, S. 77; p. 151.way, life is under the coercion of necessity.
38 Despite the fact that
Arendt doesn’t mention this concept in her writings on violence, in
the book On Revolution necessity is the first justification for war (or
the first sign that a war is just), or, as Arendt says, still not seeing a
difference between “justify” and “legitimate”, “necessities are legit-
imate motives to invoke a decision by arms.”
39
3. Bio-politics. Necessity introduces an organic coercion (life
and the “organic body” pressures the subject and he leans towards
the emancipation from that which is necessary for him
40) and the
power of a biological moment into political theory. For Arendt, one
of the firstsources and justifications of violence is the appearance of
biologicalmetaphorsandanalogiesinthethoughtsofacommunity.
Nothing, in my opinion, could be theoretically more danger-
ous than the tradition of organic thought in political matters
by which power and violence are interpreted in biological
terms.(…)Theorganicmetaphorswithwhichourentirepres-
ent discussion of these matters, especially of the riots, is per-
meated – the notion of “sick society”, of which riots are
symptoms, as fever is a symptom of disease – can only pro-
mote violence in the end.
41
4. Justification and Legitimacy. In the book On Revolution
one very important sentence represents the seed of a future differ-
ence which Arendt also never systematically “justified.”
Atheory of war or a theory of revolution, therefore, can only
deal with the justification of violence because this justifica-
tion constitutes its political limitation; if, instead, it arrives at
a glorification or justification of violence as such, it is no lon-
ger political but antipolitical.
42
Clearly provoked by the December 15
th, 1967 debate, “The
LegitimacyofViolence…,” Arendt, inordertoonce moreaffirmher
“theory of difference,” for the first time explicitly speaks of the
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38 Ibid, S. 74-75; pp. 148-149.
39 On Revolution, pp. 12-13, 64, 113.
40 Ibid, p. 114.
41 On Violence,p .7 5 .
42 On Revolution,p .1 9 .“difference” between justification /die Rechtfertigung/ and legiti-
macy /die Legitimierung/ in her Journals in January 1968 (the frag-
ment is called “Theses on Violence”)
Violence is never legitimate, but it can be justified. The origi-
nal justification of violence is power (law as institution of
power).Violenceisalwaysinstrumental,powerisessential.
43
The final attempt to uncover this difference with the help of
time (past-future) terminates with the well known stance that in
self-defence no one questions the use of violence, because danger is
present, and “the end justifying the means is immediate”.
44
At the end we must add, to all the above mentioned precondi-
tions for new thoughts on politics and violence, three great themes
about which Arendt was the only one to write in the last century: hy-
pocrisy, the secret service and political manipulation. But, neverthe-
less, “violence is no help against manipulation”.
45
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43 Denktagebuch, 1950-1973, S. 676.
44 On Violence, pp. 51-52. This fragment was modified in the first versions of
this text. “Reflections on Violence”, p. 26.
45 Denktagebuch, 1950-1973, S. 676.Petar Bojaniæ
POSLEDNJI RAT ILI RAT DA SE SVET UÈINI BEZBEDAN
ZA DEMOKRATIJU:
Nasilje i pravo kod Hannah Arendt
Sa etak
Naslov ovoga teksta je parafraza jedne beleške Hannah Arendt koja je napi-
sana avgusta 1952. godine. Posle èitanja Schmittove knjige Nomos der Erde, Arendt
pokušava da se suprotstavi njegovom razumevanju pravednog rata. U tekstu rekon-
struišem njena razlièita èitanja mnoštva tekstova politièke filozofije, u kontekstu
Arendtovog razlikovanja izmeðu nasilja i vlasti (moæi), snage i zakona. Arendtovo
odbijanje da prihvatipostojanje nasilja koje mo e „osvojiti“ slobodu i „stvoriti“ pra-
vo i demokratiju, suprotstavlja je velikoj tradiciji sledbenika Marxa, kojoj ona ne-
sumnjivopripada:da lije ina koji naèinmoguæerevolucionarnonasiljeida linasilje
kao otpor nepravdi donosi pravdu?
Kljuène reèi: pravo, zakon, snaga, nasilje, revolucija, poslednji rat, pravedni
rat, pravo na revoluciju.
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